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The Public Economy in the age of Globalization: 
Cameron revisited – Why again? 
 
Abstract 
After World War II the scope of western public sectors expanded significantly. Rapidly growing 
international economic integration in the 1980s has cast doubt on the sustainability of broad 
government involvement in the economy. In contrast, public sectors are rather retrenching in the 
face of globalization challenges. This paper first reexamines Cameron’s (1978) multiple regression 
model on the reasons for expanding public sectors in 18 OECD economies between 1960 and 1975. 
It initially confirms his results and also Rodrik’s (1997, 1998) claim that increasing openness to 
international trade induces governments to increase expenditure in order to counter rising external 
dependency. Furthermore, the results confirm the hypothesis that this policy path is more likely 
when left parties are in power. Secondly, this paper extends Cameron’s study by using panel data 
for the same 18 nations between 1960 and 2006. By applying a fixed effects model, the paper finds 
contradictory results on the effects of trade on government expenditure. The ratio of Imports and 
Exports to GDP has an inverse relationship to the scope of the public sector and therefore strongly 
confirms the economic argument that governments retrench the public sector in the face of 
globalization. 
 
Till Bullmann, CPPA, University of Massachusetts, Amherst1  
 
I. Introduction
 
In the decades following World War II  - often deemed to be the golden age of the Western 
Welfare State - the scope of the public sector2 in advanced capitalist economies increased 
dramatically. Otherwise, since the late 1980s this increase has nearly come to an halt, which is 
often brought into relationship with the challenges resulting from economic globalization. 
This empirical puzzle is: which variables determine the size of the public sector and 
which particular impact does globalization have on the evolution of the size of government? I 
first review the comparative study, in which Cameron (1978) tested the impact of globalization3 
and domestic forces for 18 OECD countries4 between 1960 and 1975 by applying first-
differences5. Secondly, in an extension of the study, I test his hypotheses on the basis of a panel 
and extend the observation period to 2006 by using a fixed effects regression model6. By that, I 
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 The scope of the public economy is defined as the share of general government receipts on the gross domestic 
product. It can be criticized that this indicator understates the size of government in countries that run a deficit. 
3
 The impact of economic globalization is operationalized by the trade openness of a country, which is measured as 
the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. 
4
 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
5
 By first differences Cameron means the difference between the values of the first and the last observation in the 
sample observation period. 
6
 For a brief overview on fixed effects regression see: Stock and Watson (2005): Chapter 10 
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can confirm Cameron’s result on the (1) positive and significant correlation of the initial level of 
trade openness and the expansion of the public sector; and (2) the positive and significant 
correlation of left party participation in central government with the change in government 
receipts.  
In my own model, however, I find a (1) negative correlation between the openness of the 
economy and the scope of the public sector. The result also holds for several socio-economic and 
political control variables. This result goes along with recent findings (Liberati 2007) and 
supports the argument of retrenching public sectors under the stress of economic globalization.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, I outline theoretical approaches that can 
account for the level of state expenditure and derive hypotheses to be tested. In section III, I 
present the methodology, the model used by Cameron and my extension of it. Section IV 
presents the results of the replication with the original as well as the extended dataset and my 
own model on the impact of economic openness on government receipts. Moreover, policy 
consequences are addressed. Part V concludes and provides an outlook for future research. 
 
II. Theories on the scope of the public sector  
 
In line with Cameron the public sector is defined as the total of general government revenues 
extracted on all administrative levels in a nation (1978: 1244). Included are all forms of taxes, 
social insurance contributions and other sources of revenues. I use the OECD wide applied 
indicator general government receipts to measure the dependent variable size of public sector. 
These revenues are expressed as a fraction of GDP in order to control for the size of the 
economy. In order to provide comparability over the reference study and my own, I use this 
indicator to measure the proportion of GDP consumed and distributed by governments7. 
A slowdown followed after the rapid increase of the size of the public sector among 
western capitalist economies until the mid-1980s. As a result, the growth of the share of public 
expenditure on the GDP almost came to a halt. Figure 1 shows this development of average 
government receipts over time. Since the mid-1980s, the ratio of government receipts to GDP 
                                                 
7
 Cameron (1978: 1244) uses the argument that in the long-run government receipts and revenues equal out, so that 
both are similar indicators for the public sector. However, this claim neglects the fact that deficit spending has been a 
widely used source of government revenues, which is not covered by the receipts indicator. On the other hand, the 
indicator used here is more stable. 
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only varies slightly. After the year 2000 a significant retrenchment seems to start, but is reversed 
by 2004. However, the period of government budget expansion stopped in the 1980s. 
Figure 1: The average scope of the public sector in 18 OECD countries over time 
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Theories that account for the variation in government receipts can, according to Cameron, 
be grouped into five categories, each providing independent explanatory power.  
In his original study he tests each theory separately. One approach Cameron applies is the 
hypothesis of internationally affected levels of government expenditure. As he finds a major 
impact of economic openness8 on the scope of the public economy, I will focus on this 
determinant in my own model later on, while controlling for various socio-economic and 
political variables. Cameron (1978: 1250-52) argues that with an increasing participation in 
international trade in goods and services, countries are more exposed to the pressures of the 
international economic environment. Unemployment becomes dependent on aggregate demand 
in world market. Therefore, national demand management policies become less effective. Even 
in a perfectly competitive economy with full employment, the state should compensate losers by 
income transfers, at least in theory.  Transfers smooth out the immediate impact of international 
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 Economic openness is operationalized by the indicator trade share, which is the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services to the GDP. 
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business cycles (Lindbeck 1975: 56) and  thereby increase the scope of the public sector ceteris 
paribus.  
This analysis gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
(H1): There is a positive relationship between the degree of openness of the economy, measured 
by the trade share and the scope and expansion of government expenditure. 
 
The argument that governments increase public expenditure in order to compensate 
domestic losers of globalization is widely known as compensation hypothesis (Rodrik 1998). 
However, there also exists an opposite argument in economic theory, summarized as efficiency 
hypothesis, which claims an inverse relationship between openness of the economy and the scope 
of the public sector. There is deadweight loss associated with government intervention that if 
eliminated would cause efficiency to increase, but if trade is to be Pareto optimal, the winners 
must be able to compensate the losers and still be better off. Thus in order for trade to be 
efficient, government must intervene to redistribute side payments to those who are made worse 
off by the policy. Taken together, the two arguments suggest an ambiguous relationship between 
trade and the size of the public sector. 
Proponents of the efficiency hypothesis emphasize the importance of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as an indicator for trade openness in order to underline their argument that an 
increasingly mobile tax base undermines the capability of governments to extract resources and 
therefore reduces the size of the public sector. Indeed, FDI has gained importance as a share of 
GDP during the 1990s just as trade did three decades earlier. Therefore its possible impact 
should be used as indicator of economic openness (Liberati 2007). I take this argument into 
consideration by controlling for capital mobility in the panel regression model with an expected 
negative sign. 
Hence with increased capital mobility, government should shrink and along with it, 
deadweight loss. But as trade and foreign investment disrupts local labor markets, governments 
might feel obliged to raise transfers and the taxes to pay for them. Thus, on theoretical grounds, 
the predicted size of the public sector could go either way.  
In the following, I introduce domestic political, institutional and economic variables that 
are tested by Cameron independently. In my own specification, I also control for socio-economic 
and political variables in order to avoid omitted variable bias. 
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A very common theory to be tested for the increase of the financial scope of governments 
is Wagner’s “law of expanding state activity” (1883: 1-8). His basic argument is that with 
increasing general wealth of a society, there is a rising demand for public goods such as 
infrastructure. Contrarily to that view Wildavsky (1975: 232-5) points out that in case of high 
economic growth, additional demand for public spending can be met with a constant share of the 
GDP; i.e. in case of rapidly increasing economic wealth relatively less compensation of losers 
from open trade is necessary. That leads to the following hypothesis:  
(H2) There is a negative relationship between economic growth and the expansion the of 
government receipts as a share of GDP. 
 
The next theory applied by Cameron (1978: 1246) claims that the nature of the fiscal 
system in a country determines the level of revenue that can be raised (Buchanan/Wagner 1977). 
In theory, the government should only be able to extract sufficient funds to provide public goods 
but in reality it can create a fiscal illusion through an opaque taxation system.  
(H3) The public sector is larger in countries whose receipts rely on less perceptible forms of 
extraction such as social security contributions and indirect taxes. 
 
The fourth explanation offered by Cameron is electoral politics (Cameron 1978: 1246-8). 
The political business cycle theory argues that incumbents are likely to expand the share of the 
public sector in order to secure voter support in the next elections (Tufte 1978). A further line of 
argument in electoral politics concerns the effect of ideological orientation of governments on 
public policy outputs. Hibbs (1977) claims that political parties make a significant difference. As 
workers and low income groups are the core clientele of social democratic and other leftist 
parties, these parties are more favorable towards increased redistributive policies.  
(H4) Countries with higher participation rates of left parties in government and more frequent 
general elections are expected to have higher growth rates of public expenditure. 
 
The fifth set of factors explaining the scope of the public sector are national institutional 
characteristics. Cameron (1978: 1248-49) claims that institutional arrangements that exhibit 
several autonomous bureaucracies and therefore fragmented spending favor the expansion of the 
public sector. This arrangement is exemplified by a federalist state organization. As unitary 
states can more easily control government receipts, Cameron expects that unitary states are 
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therefore likely to exhibit a smaller scope of government. The same should be true for a higher 
degree of fiscal centralization.  
In the remainder of this paper, I will argue differently. As federalism is one of several 
institutional features that constrain public policy options of the central government, unitary 
countries are expected to have a higher level of public expenditure than federal countries. As the 
degree of fiscal centralization necessarily is a result of the institutional structure of the state, I do 
control for several institutional barriers to policy-making in my own specification. This argument 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
(H5) Countries with more institutional barriers to policy change, such as federalism, are 
expected to have a lower level of government expenditure. 
 
If all five of these hypotheses are confirmed, the highest level of government receipts 
should be found in a unitary country with only a few institutional barriers (H5), a high trade 
share (H1), low growth rates of the economy (H2), a prevalence of indirect taxation (H3) and 
frequent elections in which left parties often succeed (H4).  
 
III. Model and Methods applied   
In this paper, I use the same sample of 18 OECD countries as Cameron (1978) in order to 
maximize comparability. Initially, observations are drawn from the years 1960 to 1975. 
Secondly, in the extension and modification of the model the observation period is extended to 
2006. Based on these panel data, I also set up a time and entity fixed effects model in order to 
control for effects that vary over the examined entities but are constant over time (Stock and 
Watson 2005: 316-323). Thirdly, in my own specification I emphasize on the impact of 
economic openness on government receipts, but nevertheless control for domestic political and 
economic variables. 
 
Two models explaining government receipts 
Following Cameron, I apply general OLS and regress the same variables he uses on the 
difference in the ratio of government receipts to GDP from 1960 and 1975 (Gvtrecpt∆7560)9. In 
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 Data for gvtrecpt are obtained from the Comparative Political Data Set 2006 (CPDS) for the years between 1970 
and 2006. For the period 1960-69, I obtained data from various OECD publications. Data for the years 1961 and 
1962 are missing (1982): Economic Outlook 1960-1980 (Tab.6.5), National Accounts 1963-1980 Vol2. (Tab 1-8,9-
12) Current receipts (Tab 9) were divided by the GDP at current prices (Tab 1). 
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each regression I also control for the level of state expenditure in 1960 (Gvtrecpt60). The 
following equation presents the baseline model, where ß2 and  ß3 are the regressors to assess the 
impact of the change in trade share between 1960 and 1975 (Trdshr∆7560) on the scope of the 
public sector (H1). In order to avoid overestimating high increases in trade share that due to a 
low initial level, I control for the level of trade share in 1960 (Trdshr60). 
Gvtrecpt∆7560 = ß0  +  ß1* Gvtrecpt60 + ß 2* Trdshr60 + ß3* Trdshr∆7560 + ui              (1) 
 
Likewise, I test hypotheses (H2)-(H5) with this baseline model by substituting x2 and x3 
according to the propositions. Additionally, I follow the procedure Cameron pursues by 
combining the respectively “strongest” coefficients in a combined regression10.
 
The extension to 2006 of the Cameron model by using panel data with time and entity fixed 
effects is given by  
Gvtrecpt
 it = ß0  + ß1* Gvtrecpt60 i + ß2* Trdshr it + ß3* Trdshr60 i  + ß 4* Country_dum it + ß 5* 
Year_dum
 it + u it               (2) 
 
Equation (2) tests hypothesis (H1). By substituting x2 and x3,  hypotheses (H2)-(H5) are tested 
accordingly. In this model I create entity and time dummy variables in order to control for 
unknown variables over time and entities. The dependent variable changes in so far, as I do not 
apply the difference in government expenditure from 1960 and 1975. Instead, I regress the 
determinants on the actual ratio of government receipts divided by GDP. 
 
The impact of economic openness on the size of the public sector  
In my own specification, I again regress government receipts (Gvtrecpt
 it) on the openness of the 
economy (Trdshrit) with the following baseline equation. By using dummy variables for 
countries and years I control for unobserved factors over time and space.  
 
Gvtrecpt
 it = ß0  +  ß3* Trdshr it + ß1* Country_dum it + ß 2* Year_dum it + ∑(Z it) + u it                  (3) 
 
After testing this base specification, I control for additional variables (∑(Z
 it)) that – according to 
the above outlined theoretical framework – have an impact on the level of government receipts. 
                                                                                                                                                              
For Switzerland data for the years 1980-89: OECD (1992): Economic Outlook Historical Statistics 1960-1990 
10
 He calculated the beta-values of all regressors and chose on that basis which variables to include in the combined 
regression, what is a doubtable procedure. 
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For institutional variation I use an index of institutional constraints for policy-making by central 
governments (Instcons)11. According to the above outlined argument that fast growing economies 
can satisfy the public demand for the compensation of economic losers by a smaller fraction of 
their GDP, I also control for the impact of economic growth on the level of government receipts. 
As lawmakers by definition also have an impact on the level of government expenditure, I 
account for the ideological orientation of governments by measuring the participation of left 
parties in government (Govleft). As there are theoretical and empirical arguments for a higher 
trade share in small countries (see Cameron 1978: 1249-50), I account for this factor by 
controlling for the size of the population. As trade share does not cover capital movements I 
avoid possible bias by adding the respective ratio of FDI net outflows to GDP. Last but not least 
I include the unemployment rate to account for this economic source of government expenditure 
variation12.  
 
IV. Results and Policy Consequences 
a. Results of the 1960-75 Period 
 
Table 1 presents results of the replication of Cameron’s study of the period 1960 – 75, which turn 
out to be similar (1978)13. Testing hypothesis (H1) through (H5) individually with the respective 
forms of equation (1), the multiple regressions yield two significant determinants of the growth in 
the scope of the public sector: First, the coefficient in regression (1) shows that the level of trade 
in goods and services in 1960 has a positive relationship with the growth of public expenditure. 
This positive correlation is also displayed in Figure 2. 
The changes of trade share and government receipts from 1960 to 1975, however, are negatively 
correlated, even though not significantly. As for all other specification, the initial level of 
government receipts has been held constant. The coefficient of the trade share in 1960 only 
shows a fairly strong impact (0.176) on the growth of the public sector. In sum, Cameron’s first 
hypothesis (H1) can only be partially strongly confirmed, based on this sample and methodology. 
 
                                                 
11
 Data are taken from Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS). This additive indicator ranging from 0 to 5 is the sum 
of six dummy variables that account for EU membership, federalism, strong bicameralism, difficulty of amending 
the constitution, central bank autonomy and frequent referenda. 
12
 Data are taken from the CPDS, with the exception for FDI net outflows that are drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  
13
 For original regression results see: Cameron (1978): 1252. 
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Figure 2: Trade Share 1960 and the Growth of the public sector between 1960 and 1975 
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The second significant correlation is displayed in regression (4). It shows that hypothesis 
(H4) on the expanding impact of left party government participation on receipts can be strongly 
confirmed at a 5% significance level. The coefficient seems to be small in size, but comparing a 
country with a conservative to a country with an entirely leftist government, the latter country is 
estimated to have a higher level of government receipts by 11 percentage points. The claim about 
rising expenditures in case of frequent elections can also be weekly confirmed.  
Regression (2) displays the results of testing hypothesis (H2) about the negative 
relationship between economic growth and government revenues. Regression outcomes weakly 
contradict this proposition, as there is almost no linear relationship between the independent and 
the scope of the public sector.  
Regression (3) demonstrates that hypothesis (H3) of an expansionist impact of the “fiscal 
illusion” can be weakly contradicted. The result – however not significant – predicts a decrease in 
governments expenditure, when government receipts rather rely on indirect taxes and social 
security contributions instead of direct taxes. 
Regression (5) weakly confirms the hypothesis (H5) that the institutional constraint 
federalism works restricting on government expenditure. This finding is supported by the positive 
correlation between the degree of fiscal centralization and the scope of the public sector. 
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However, the coefficients are not even significant on a 10% level of significance. Thus, 
regressions (2), (3) and (5) yield no significant correlations. Only regression (1) and (4) 
demonstrate significant results in favor of the respective hypotheses and pass the F-test. 
Table 1 : Replication of Cameron’s regression results on the determinants of the  expansion of the public sector 
Dependent Variable: Government Receipts as Percentage of GDP 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government Receipts 1960 0.133 0.31 0.450* 0.0883 0.472** 0.0477 
 0.17 0.34 0.24 0.31 0.22 0.15 
Trade share 1960 0.176***     0.154*** 
 0.024     0.021 
Increase of trade share 1960-75 in 
percentage points 
-0.0787 
0.074 
     
GDP per capita 1960  -0.617     
  
0.95 
    
 0.000164    0.263 Average growth of  GDP, 1960-75 in 
% 
 
0.00035 
   
0.51 
  -0.178   -0.0762 % of government revenues from 
indirect taxes and Social Security 
Payments 1960 
  
0.1 
  
0.053 
  -0.0674    % increase of government revenues 
from indirect taxes and Social 
Security Contributions 1960-75 
  0.19    
   0.114**  0.0704** Left parties in government 1960-75 
in % 
   
0.041 
 
0.028 
   0.429   Number of national legislative 
elections 1960-75 
   
0.64 
  
    -0.797  Federalism dummy 
 
    
2.72 
 
    0.152 0.0316 Central government share of all 
receipts 1960 
    
0.12 0.053 
Constant -0.984 2.407 8.247 2.312 -12.95 1.363 
 
4.55 14 9.67 6.9 10.8 7.43 
R² 0.71 0.17 0.28 0.43 0.25 0.87 
R² adjusted 0.65 0 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.80 
F-Test 22.78 2.64 2.23 8.70 1.92 22.74 
Prob > F 0.000 0.09 0.1296 0.0017 0.1726 0.00 
Standard errors in Italics; n=18; Levels of significance: *** at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. 
 
Regression (6) displays the replication of Cameron’s combined regression using the 
“strongest” coefficients, which is a methodologically rather doubtable procedure. It includes 
variables for all five hypotheses. The initial level of trade openness 1960 and the ideological 
orientation of governments remain viable predictors of the change in government receipts. Even 
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though, no other indicator becomes significant, the model yields a very high determination 
coefficient (R² adj. = 0.80) and has an F-value of 22.74. Nevertheless, Cameron’s final 
specification (6) has to be criticized, as it is a stepwise regression. Moreover, he justifies the 
choice of the variables with the level of the higher standardized regression (beta) coefficient in 
each single test (Cameron 1978: 1254). This is the reason for that some variables have been left 
out in regression (6). 
 
b. Results of the period from 1960 to 2006 
 
By using panel data for the years from 1960 to 2006 I reexamine Cameron’s hypotheses and 
assess whether his findings are also applicable for a longer period. In equation (2), I measure the 
size of the public sector by the actual level of government receipts with respect to GDP. This 
alters the specification in equation (1), in which the dependent variable is understood as a change 
in government receipts from 1960 to 1975. Table 2 shows the test for hypothesis (H1) of an 
increasing public sector as reaction to deepening international economic integration. 
Table 2: The impact of economic openness on government receipts 
Dependent Variable: Government Receipts as Percentage of GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Regressor Pooled OLS Entity Fixed Effects 
Time & Entity Fixed 
Effects 
Government Receipts 1960 1.099*** 0.612*** 0.653*** 
 0.052 0.058 0.039 
Trade share 0.133*** 0.219*** -0.0547*** 
 0.018 0.022 0.016 
Trade share 1960 -0.0358 -0.130*** 0.0920*** 
 0.023 0.022 0.015 
Constant 3.370** 14.73*** 26.10*** 
 1.45 1.91 1.54 
Observations 773 773 773 
R² 0.48 0.73 0.91 
R² adjusted 0.48 0.73 0.90 
F-Test 262.67 201.75 182.08 
F-Test H0: fixed effects=0 -- 49.9 59.75 
Entity fixed effects no yes yes 
Time fixed effects no no yes 
Standard errors in Italics; Levels of significance: *** at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. 
Regression (1) uses pooled OLS, that is panel data without time and entity effects, and 
thereby strongly confirms the hypothesis that increased economic openness is associated with a 
higher level of government receipts. This conclusion can also be maintained when in regression 
(2) it is controlled for country fixed effects, i.e. non-observed variables that vary over entities but 
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are constant over time. The F-test for the joint hypothesis that fixed effects are significant yields 
a sufficiently high value of 49.9 to reject the null hypothesis that there is no such relationship. 
In regression (3) I additionally control for time fixed effects, i.e. omitted factors that 
influences all countries but vary over time. Indeed, this approach results in an opposite finding. 
While the coefficient for the initial level of government receipts 1960 still results in a positive 
significant sign, the effect of increased economic openness is reversed. Although the coefficient 
is less strong than before, Cameron’s hypothesis (H1) is robustly rejected. An increased level of 
trade share leads to declining government expenditure. Apparently, economic globalization 
results in fiscal pressure on the nation state which is less capable of extracting the same amount 
of financial resources. The null hypothesis that entity and time fixed effects have no explanative 
power can be rejected (F-value 59.75). 
As time and entity fixed effects have a high impact on the results of the re-examination, I 
control for them when revising the other hypotheses, too. Table 3 shows the results of testing 
hypotheses (H2-H5) using the fixed effects model. 
In contrast to the initial result, regression (4) shows that hypothesis (H2), which claims a 
negative correlation of economic growth and the scope of the public economy can be strongly 
confirmed. Slowly growing industrialized countries in tendency feature a higher level of 
government expenditure, as more dynamic economies can meet public demands for an increase 
in expenditure by a constant share of GDP. 
Regression (5) weekly confirms hypothesis (H3). Countries that rather rely on 
government revenues from social security contributions and indirect taxation show a tendency 
toward a greater scope of the public sector, because this way of extracting funds is more opaque 
(“fiscal illusion”) and therefore harder to observe and criticize for the demos. However, 
inference is very limited, as the coefficient does not pass the 10% significance threshold and is 
additionally very small. 
In contrast to Cameron’s findings, I cannot to confirm hypothesis (H4) of an expansionist 
influence of leftist parties on state budgets, shown in regression (6). This result is particularly 
interesting, as leftist government still have the reputation of increasing the scope of government 
when they come to power. The same direction of correlation has been estimated for the influence 
of a high frequency of legislative elections. Countries with more frequent elections during the 
period from 1960-2004 have significantly lower levels of government expenditure. 
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A rather contradictive result emerges in regression (7), which tests the hypothesis of the 
expenditure limiting influence of federalism and regional control over funds. On the one hand, 
federalism is estimated to exert an expansionist influence on the size of the public sector. On the 
other hand, the same positive correlation is estimated for a higher share of central government 
receipts as a fraction of general government revenues. As both coefficients are significant, either 
theoretical claims or validity of the indicators have to be reconsidered. 
Table 3: Domestic determinants of the size of the public sector – time and entity fixed effects 
Dependent Variable Government Receipts as Percent of GDP  
Regressor (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Government Receipts 1960 0.877*** 0.827*** 0.895*** 0.570*** 
 0.027 0.035 0.03 0.052 
GDP per capita 1960 -0.000368***    
 
0.000035 
   
Growth of GDP in % -0.385***    
 0.068    
% of government revenues from indirect taxes  -0.0860**   
and Social Security Contributions 1960  0.039   
% of government revenues from indirect taxes  0.00318   
and Social Security Contributions  0.0086   
Left parties in government 1960 to 2004 in %   -0.000983  
 
  0.0034  
Number of legislative elections 1960-2004   -0.740***  
 
  0.057  
Central government share of receipts 1960    0.160*** 
 
   0.025 
Federalism dummy    1.745*** 
 
   0.57 
Constant 8.046*** 27.13*** 25.07*** 14.97*** 
 
1.88 2.79 1.53 2.41 
Observations 752 767 767 754 
R² 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 
R² adjusted 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 
F-Test 163.1 200.05 184.97 490.54 
H0: fixed effects=0 66.69 85.84 74.08 130.35 
Standard errors in Italics; Levels of significance: *** at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. 
In sum, testing hypothesis (H1)-(H5) in an extended panel yields  rather different 
findings. Only inverse relationship between economic growth and government receipts (H2) can 
be strongly confirmed. All other hypotheses have a least been weakly rejected. The most striking 
difference is the revealed inverse correlation of economic openness and the level of government 
receipts (H1). Therefore, in the following section, I take a closer look on the relationship 
between trade share and government receipts. I do that by not only controlling for entity and time 
fixed effects, but also I do control for possibly omitted socio-economic and political variables. 
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c. The impact of economic openness on the scope of the public sector 
 
In this third section on the regression results I examine my own specification from equation (3). 
The impact of economic openness is measured by the trade share and its influence on the size of 
the public sector. Table 4 gives the regression results. Regression (1) displays a positive 
significant relationship between trade share and the level of government receipts. By adding 
entity fixed effects in regression (2), this results remains viable and support Cameron’s findings. 
However, when time fixed effects are additionally included in regression (3), the 
coefficient changes the sign and is again significant. Thus, there is an external effect that overall 
affects the countries at a certain point of time. Thus, compensating possible losers of increased 
trade-openness might not experience political support anymore. Or it is eliminated as a policy 
option due to externally induced fiscal pressure on the respective economies. With respect to 
robustness, the F-test (value 132.94) clearly underlines this finding. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that there are no time fixed effects can be rejected  
In regression (4) I control for the impact of foreign direct investment, as this indicator of 
economic openness additionally brings in the increasing impact of international capital transfers 
on national economies. I also find a significant inverse relationship between FDI and government 
receipts. Thus, the sign of both indicators contradicts the compensation hypothesis (H1) that 
government increases expenditure in order to compensate domestic losers of economic 
globalization. In contrast, the findings support the argument that nation states are forced to 
retrench their spending in order to maintain a competitive economic environment by not 
increasing taxes.  
Regression (5) and (6) introduce several control variables in order to pursue a sensitivity 
analysis, whereat regression (6) again contains the FDI variable. This time, however the FDI 
coefficient changes the sign but is not significant, a finding that contradicts the argument of 
contracting influence of capital openness on state budgets.  On the other hand, the variable trade 
share continues to show a negative and significant sign. Therefore, it remains a viable estimator 
of the size of the public sector but loses only some of its robustness.  
Thus, the control variables account for forces that have been omitted in regression (1) to 
(4) and increase the robustness of the model. As claimed in the original hypothesis (H2), 
economic growth is negatively associated with the level of government expenditure. This 
coefficient not only becomes stronger, but additionally is significant at the 1% level. The same 
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holds for the expansionist effect of unemployment on the scope of the public sector. The reason 
to control for the population size is to into account that bigger countries do not depend as much 
on trade as small countries do.  
Table 4: The impact of  economic openness on the size of the public sector – time and entity fixed effects 
Dependent Variable Government Receipts as Percent of GDP 
   
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trade Share 0.141*** 0.219*** -0.0547*** -0.0869*** -0.0420** -0.0364* 
 0.011 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.02 0.021 
Growth of GDP in % 
    -0.307*** -0.355*** 
 
    0.066 0.073 
Left parties in government 
1960-2004 in %     
-0.00203 
0.0041 
0.00423 
0.004 
Institutional Constraints     -1.766 -1.903 
     1.27 1.27 
Unemployment rate     0.188*** 0.180*** 
     0.051 0.062 
Population in Millions     -0.132*** -0.0513*** 
     0.018 0.019 
FDI, ratio of Net     -0.0258*  0.112 
Outflows to GDP    0.015  0.11 
Constant 32.51*** 27.70*** 38.41*** 47.39*** 70.93*** 54.49*** 
 0.66 0.45 1.18 3.15 9.54 2.49 
Observations 773 773 773 601 616 453 
R² 0.22 0.73 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.95 
R² adjusted 0.22 0.73 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.94 
F-Test 169.32 201.75 182.08 235.99 392.76 912.35 
H0:fixed effects=0 -- 120.71 132.94 182.53 6671.89 591.17 
Entity fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Standard errors in Italics; Levels of significance: *** at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level.  
 
Hypothesis (H4) of an expansionist influence of leftist government on government 
receipts is rejected again. Hypothesis (H5), claiming a expenditure limiting effect of national 
institutional barriers, can be weakly confirmed. The more institutional constraints are to be found 
in country, the more often a central government attempt to expand spending is blocked. This 
coefficient on institutional constraints only slightly misses to match the 10% significance 
threshold.   
In sum, on an empirical ground I can strongly confirm the economic argument that in 
industrialized countries, the increasing exposure toward trade openness impedes a more active 
role of government in compensating globalization losers by monetary transfers. This analysis 
remains robust when a rigorous sensitivity test is applied. 
 
16 
d. Policy implications 
 
According to my results, increased economic openness leads to a stronger economic dependency 
on the world market. National governments react toward the increased mobility of production 
factors, as their taxation becomes more difficult. Margins of maneuver to tax capital and interest 
became more narrow and restrict governments in their capability to extract resources. This 
external pressure is underlined by the finding that even leftist governments do not increase 
government expenditure. That does not mean that the “tax state” is in peril, but a further 
expansion of government receipts is not as easy as it was until the 1980s. The tax-base might 
switch to rather immobile factors, such as labor in order to finance the increased costs of 
globalization that often occur in the form of high unemployment among low skilled labor force. 
Negative consequences of this “redistribution within one class” are additional costs for the 
production factor labor and an increase in competitive disadvantages. For industrialized countries 
of this sample policies should encourage further specialization and an intensified effort to 
develop human capital by emphasizing policies on education. Simple redistributive 
compensation policies instead, only cures symptoms but does not tackle its roots.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the study of Cameron from 1978 on the determinants of the scope the public sector 
has been examined and found incomplete. Based on the original sample and without controlling 
for time fixed effects, it could be confirmed that trade share on the GDP as an indicator for 
openness of the economy has a positive and significant relationship with the scope of the public 
sector. Similar findings can be reported for the effect of left parties in government.  
This conclusion, however, does not hold when it is controlled for time fixed effects across 
the panel. No such impact of leftist governments on the level of state expenditure can be 
confirmed. Moreover, the coefficient for trade share changes the sign. As it is significant on the 
95% level, the original hypothesis (H1) has been strongly rejected. Thus, more economic 
openness rather leads to decreasing government receipts. This finding holds even for the 
inclusion of several socio-economic and political control variables. The impact of capital 
openness, which has been assessed by introducing FDI net outflows, however, remains 
inconclusive.  
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The applied main indicators trade and capital openness should be used to measure the 
influence on subcategories of government revenues, in order to further assess the impact of 
international economic integration on the public sector. Possible dependent variables could be 
either found on the territorial or functional dimension of governments. The latter, such as social 
policy, might be an especially fertile field of research, because economic theory predicts 
shrinking receipts resulting from the “exit-pressure” of the increasingly mobile tax-base capital 
and a shift towards heavier taxation of rather immobile tax-bases such as labor. 
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